We consider abstract exchange mechanisms wherein individuals submit "diversi…ed" o¤ers in m commodities, which are then redistributed to them. Our …rst result is that if the mechanism satis…es certain natural conditions embodying "fairness"and "convenience"then it admits unique prices, in the sense of consistent exchange-rates across commodity pairs ij that equalize the valuation of o¤ers and returns for each individual.
Introduction
The early history of human settlement is intimately connected with economic specialization and the concomitant need to exchange commodities, which led to the formation of urban communities where such trades might be better e¤ected. These communities were in regular con ‡ict with one another, with the successful ones progressing from villages to cities to states. Many ancient civilizations seemed to have followed a similar evolutionary path and to have further developed the notion of "money" -a commodity that served as a medium of exchange. The Sumerians used barley, silver, and gold at various stages. Other societies have used cowrie shells, beads, or even large stone disks. In modern times money mostly takes the form of paper, deemed su¢ cient to settle private and public debt by …at of the government.
The central question inevitably arises: what are the imperatives that lead to the emergence of a money in an exchange economy? This has been explored in the literature in terms of overcoming frictions in trade, such as the di¢ culty of "a double coincidence of wants" 1 or transactions costs (see section 1.3 for a survey). These analyses have been carried out in the framework of a group of sophisticated individuals who maximize utilities in competitive interaction with one another in an economic equilibrium.
Our aim is to show that there is a more elementary rationale for the emergence of money, based on considerations that arise prior to the onset of utilitarianism. To the extent that di¤erent urban communtites may have developed di¤erent mechanisms of exchanging goods, one can fruitfully apply the idea of competition to the "exchange mechanisms" themselves. Thus one may ask, what attributes of a mechanism might provide it a competitive advantage over others? In this paper we focus on two such attributes, namely "fairness"and "convenience"or "ease of use".
We start with a mechanism stripped down to its bare minimum, leaving only what is necessary to enable trade in a …xed …nite set f1; : : : ; mg of commodities. The mechanism takes in o¤ers, possibly diversi…ed, of each commodity from an arbitrary set of individuals and then redistributes back to them everything that it has received. We impose …ve conditions on the mechanism that we term anonymity, non-dissipation, aggregation, invariance, and ‡exibility, which re ‡ect the twin attributes of fairness and convenience. Although there are in…nitely many mechanisms satisfying these conditions, our …rst result is that every such mechanism admits unique prices, in the sense of consistent exchange-rates across commodity pairs that equalize the valuation of o¤ers and returns for each individual. We next de…ne some natural notions of "complexity" for a mechanism and, in keeping with the idea of convenience, we study mechanisms with minimal complexity. Our second result is that there are only a …nite number of minimal mechanisms, and these moreover have a very special graphical structure. Markets emerge for various commodities, and prices mediate trade across these markets in a strong sense: the return to a trader depends only on his own o¤er and the prices.
Finally we introduce certain re…ned notions of complexity for this …-nite class and study the corresponding minimal mechanisms, which we term strongly minimal. It turns out that there are only three strongly minimal mechanisms, up to a relabeling of commodities. In one of these, a single commodity emerges endogenously as money and mediates trade among decentralized markets for the other commodities. Moreover, with a moderate increase in the number of commodities, the money mechanism quickly supersedes the other two in a very precise sense.
Note that our analyis addresses the question: "Why money?"It is totally silent on: "What money?" There is considerable discussion in the classical literature (see,e,g., [17] , [19] , [20] , [21] , [27] , [37] ) regarding the di¤erent criteria for the choice of a suitable "commodity money"such as its portability, veri…ability, divisibility and durability; or, alternatively, the backing of the state requisite to sustain "…at money". (For a recent survey on both kinds of money, see [42] and [43] ). Our analysis is quite compatible with this literature 2 , being only at pains to point out the urgency of appointing some money. In the absence of money, as most tellingly recounted by Jevons [17] ; matters may get really out of hand! "Some years since, Mademoiselle Zélie, a singer of the Théâtre Lyrique at Paris, made a professional tour round the world, and gave a concert in the Society Islands. In exchange for an air from Norma and a few other songs, she was to receive a third part of the receipts. When counted, her share was found to consist of three pigs, twenty-three turkeys, forty-four chickens, …ve thousand cocoa-nuts, besides considerable quantities of bananas, lemons, and oranges. At the Halle in Paris, as the prima donna remarks in her lively letter, printed by M. Wolowski, this amount of live stock and vegetables might have brought four thousand francs, which would have been good remuneration for …ve songs. In Society Islands, however, pieces of money were very scarce; and as Mademoiselle could not consume any considerable portion of the receipts herself, it became necessary in the mean time to feed the pigs and poultry with the fruit."
The discussion we shall present will be somewhat dry and mathematical, and certainly lacking in the liveliness of Mademoiselle Zélie's recollections, but we hope that it may serve as a useful supplement. For the convenience of the reader we provide an outline of our model and results in somewhat greater detail in the next two subsections, postponing the formal discussion till section 2.
Outline of the Model
Our analysis is carried out in the spirit 3 of mechanism-design, with the aim -as was said -of rendering trade as fair and as convenient as possible. 2 Our model can equally accomodate …at money or commodity money, depending on how preferences are introduced. Indeed, all we suppose is that the m items being traded are distinguishable from one another. In particular, o¤ers could just be quotes (think of e-commerce!), instead of actual shipment of goods; in which case the mechanism is quoting back what each individual is entitled to receive. Our model leaves the door wide open as to whether the quoted promises of delivery and the entitlements due are to be netted, or not; and what penalties need be levied for default in deliveries. 3 However we are not trying to implement, via dominant or Nash strategies, any desired "solution" on a given domain of indviduals'characteristics, as is common in much of the mechanism-design literature. In our framework, there are no such characteristics to begin with; nor therefore any solution emanating from them. We use the word "mechanism" (see section 1.1.3.1 of [26] ) "with its "plain english"meaning instead of the meaning it has been given in technical parlance."And its express purpose is to enable everyman to trade, To enable individuals to play a more in ‡uential role in the drama of trade beyond just their o¤er of commodities, we introduce a common language in which they may communicate with the mechanism M . No structure is imposed on the language except that it be of …nite size. There is, for each commodity i, an abstract …nite 4 set K i = K i (M ), whose elements may be thought of as costless messages that accompany o¤ers in i: The elements of K i thus serve to diversify the o¤ers in i, and that is their sole purpose. To emphasize the abstract nature of the language, we use the agnostic name i-index for an element of K i . It is our purpose to see how far matters can develop with the use of such a language. The reader may …nd the following concrete analogy useful to keep our abstract scenario in mind. Imagine a set K i of "bins" made available for each commodity i. An "elementary action" consists of depositing a quantity of i into one of the bins in K i . Based upon the entire conglomeration of elementary actions, the mechanism M assigns a return vector in R m + to every such action, and in the process sends back all the commodities it has received, emptying out the bins. An individual is, of course, free to take as many actions as he wants and add up the returns that the mechanism sends back for each of his actions.
Fixing a mechanism M , the overall o¤er of commodities by an individual may be represented, for expositional convenience, by a vector in 5 R K + , where K = K 1K m denotes the disjoint union of the K i . (It will shortly become evident, in view of the aggregation condition we impose below on M , that this is tantamount to allowing the individual to take any …nite number of "elementary actions" that were referred to earlier.) The mechanism, as was said, then redistributes the o¤ers made by all the n individuals in the population, sending back to each a return vector in R m + , and conserving commodities in the process. The collection of maps from n-o¤ers to n-returns (one map for each n) constitutes 6 the mechanism M . Our …ve conditions on mechanisms are as follows.
with the simple expedient of o¤ering commodities and without having to account for his precise motivation or even bothering to pretend that he has one. 4 As we vary M the cardinality of K 1 ; : : : ; K m ranges over all m-tuples of positive integers, thus there is no a priori upper bound on the size of the language. 5 For any …nite set X; we denote by A X the set of maps from X to A: Thus R X is the Euclidean space whose axes are indexed by the elements of X; and R X + and R X ++ are its non-negative and strictly positive orthants. When X = f1; : : : ; mg is the set of commodities, we write R m etc. for brevity (since commodities are …xed throughout). 6 When there is a continuum of traders, our analysis goes through mutatis mutandis after making the obvious changes (see section 10).
The …rst condition, anonymity, stipulates that the mechanism be blind to all characteristics of a trader other than his o¤er. In other words, any two traders who send in the same o¤er are assigned the same returns.
The second condition, aggregation, is says that if a trader pretends to be two di¤erent persons by splitting his o¤er, others'returns are una¤ected.
If either of these conditions were violated, trade would become a cumbersome a¤air: each individual would need to keep track of the full distribution of o¤ers across the entire population, and then …gure out how to diversify his own o¤ers in response. Thus these conditions contribute to convenience in trade. They also embody fairness, allowing free entry to any number of participants in a non-discriminatory fashion, and making the mechanism more "inclusive".
It is an immediate consequence of anonymity and aggregation that the return to any individual is a function only of his own o¤er a 2 R K + and the aggregate b 2 R K ++ of all o¤ers 7 ; moreover this function r(a; b) is the same for all traders. (In light of this fact, we shall call the aggregate vector b the state of the mechanism.). We de…ne the net trade function to be (a; b) = r(a; b) a; where a 2 R m + is the vector of commodities "used up" in making the o¤er a 2 R
The third condition is invariance. Its main content is that the maps which comprise M are invariant under a change of units in which commodities are measured. This makes the mechanism much simpler to operate in: one does not need to keep track of seven pounds or seven kilograms or seven tons, just the numeral 7 will do.
The fourth condition is non-dissipation and says that no trader's return can be less commodity-wise than his o¤er, i.e., if (a; b) 6 = 0; then at least one component of (a; b) must be positive. Such unfortunate traders would tend to abandon the mechanism.
To state our …nal condition we consider the perspective of a binary ijtrader 8 , who wishes to interact with the mechanism to exchange a single commodity i for some other commodity j. Note that if a is an o¤er of i in an index h 2 K i , the return r (a; b) will in general be a commodity bundle, whose composition may depend on the state b. If r (a; b) consists exclusively 7 Throughout we shall assume that on aggregate all indices are active, i.e., b is a strictly positive vector. (It will su¢ ce, for our purposes, to characterize the behavior of the mechanisms on this restricted interior domain.) 8 Binary trades will shortly be seen to form an iterative basis for all trade.
of commodity j for all states b and all 9 h-o¤ers a, we will say that h is a "pure" ij-index or an ij-market. In the absence of such markets, an ij-trader may be forced to accept commodity j bundled with other commodities.
The …fth condition we impose on the mechanism is ‡exibility. It requires that there are "enough" markets to enable individuals to "unbundle" their returns. More precisely, we require that if r (a; b) has a positive j-component for some market state b and some o¤er a solely in i, then the mechanism has an ij-market.
The Key Results
We shall identify mechanisms, which are of "minimal complexity" amongst those that satisfy the …ve conditions above. Two relevant notions of complexity will be developed from the standpoint of binary traders A natural concern of such a trader is: what is the minimum number of time periods ij (M ) needed to convert i to j? (The precise de…nitions of "conversion"and ij (M ) are given in section 3.1.) We say that a mechanism is connected if ij (M ) < 1 for all i 6 = j, and we write M = M(m) for the class of connected mechanisms satisfying the …ve conditions. Let R We can now state our …rst result.
Every mechanism of M admits a unique price function.
On account of value conservation, it is evident that binary trades form an iterative basis of all trade for mechanisms in M, reinforcing our focus on them. Note that value conservation is perforce true on the aggregate since commodities are neither created nor destroyed by the mechanism, only redistributed. Thus what the result essentially shows is that the mechanism does not assign "pro…table"trades to some at the expense of others.
The other major concern of our binary trader is also clear: how much of commodity j can he get per unit of i? It follows from our …rst result that he can calculate this in terms of his own o¤er of i and the state of the mechanism which determines the exchange rate 11 p i =p j . De…ne ij (M ) to be cardinality of the minimal set of components of the state of the mechanism required to compute the function p i =p j ; equivalently the minimal set of bins that he (or, the mechanism) needs to look into in order to calculate this rate.
(For the precise de…nition, see section 3.3.) The arrays of integers ij (M ) and ij (M ), as we vary over all distinct pairs ij, represent respectively the time complexity and price complexity 12 of the mechanism. To these arrays we add, by way of a subsidiary consideration, the sizes k i (M ) of K i (M ) for 1 i m which measure message complexity.
Given two mechanisms M and M 0 in M; we say that M is no more complex than M For any directed, connected graph G with vertex set f1; : : : ; mg ; one can de…ne a mechanism M G in M such that K i is the set of outgoing edges at vertex i:(see [8] and section (4.2)) Such "G-mechanisms" have very special structure. All the indices are pure, i.e. each edge of G is a market; furthermore, it turns out that prices mediate trade across the markets of M G (see equation (3) ) in the sense mentioned earlier: the return to a trader depends only on his own o¤er and the market prices. Thus prices play the full- ‡edged role of a "decoupling device"in any G-mechanism.
Denote by M g = M g (m) the …nite set of all G-mechanisms in M: We can state our second result.
M is a subset of M g ; in particular, M is a …nite set.
Though the mechanisms in M are …nite in number, they could be nu- 11 If there is a continuum of traders, his own action has no e¤ect on the exchange rate and so he can compute the conversion easily. Otherwise he needs to track how his o¤er alters the state of the market, and thereby the exchange rate. This complication may be ignored, to a …rst order of approximation, if there are su¢ ciently many traders in the population. 12 One could equally have used the term "informational complexity" or -with more accuracy but less panache -"price-informational complexity." merous. So we introduce a …ner complexity distinction on M : Let (M ) and (M ) denote the maximum of the numbers ij (M ) and ij (M ). These capture, respectively, time complexity and price complexity in the worstcase scenario. For M and M 0 in M ; we write
We will refer to W -minimal mechanisms in M (m) as strongly minimal and denote by M = M (m) the set of such mechanisms.
To state our next result, we introduce three special graphs: the star graph with edges im; mi for all i < m; the cycle graph with edges 12; 23; :::; m1; and the complete graph with edges ij; all i 6 = j.
If m > 3 then, up to relabelling of commodities, M (m) consists of precisely the three special mechanisms; their complexities as follows:
The star mechanism thus either outright dominates any non-star mechanism component-wise (being strictly better in some component, and no worse in the other); or else, it loses by a slight margin in some component, but wins by a huge margin in the other component (the margin of victory going to in…nity with m). An immediate upshot is that if we take any weighted sum A (M )+B (M ) as a proxy for total complexity, where A and B are arbitrary positive constants, then the star mechanism will be the unique minimizer of total complexity in M(m) for su¢ ciently large m.
Related Literature
The emergence of money and its role in the exchange of commodities has been a matter of considerable discussion in economics. We present some references that are only indicative, and far from exhaustive. (For a more comprehensive survey, see [37] , [42] , [43] .)
Jevons [17] emphasized four distinct functions of money, which were subsequently popularized as follows in a couplet by Milnes [28] : "Money's a matter of functions four, A Medium, a Measure, a Standard, a Store".
While there may be debate on details, the overall categorization of Jevons has survived, even into modern textbooks on macroeconomics, although many authors (see, e.g., [1] , [25] ) now tend to subsume one of the four functions (the "standard") under the other three. However, as Jevons himself pointed out, the "medium of exchange" function provides the logical foundation upon which the others stand (Chapter 3 of [17] , italics ours):
"Being accustomed to exchange things frequently for sums of money, people learn the value of other articles in terms of money", with the upshot that that money becomes the unit of account, or "measure of value", for all transactions. In the same vein, referring to the units for deferred payments when credit comes into play, Jevons notes that "it will, of course, be desirable to select as the standard of value that which appears likely to continue to exchange for many other commodities." Finally he observes that to have a "store of value"it is requisite that whatever is put into storage should be usable, possibly upon liquidation, as a medium of exchange when it is retrieved; and hence "the current money of a country is perhaps more likely to ful…l these conditions than anything else, although diamonds and other precious stones, and articles of exceptional beauty and rarity, might occasionally be employed".
Several search-theoretic models, involving random bilateral meetings between long-lived agents, have been developed following Jevons [17] (see, e.g., [2] , [16] , [18] , [23] , [24] , [22] , [29] , [45] and the references therein). These models turn on utility-maximizing behavior and beliefs of the agents in Nash equilibrium, and shed light on which commodities are likely to get adopted as money. A parallel, equally distinctive, strand of literature builds on partial or general equilibrium models with other kinds of frictions in trade, such as limited trading opportunities in each period, or transactions costs (see, e.g., [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [30] , [31] , [43] , [44] , [46] ). In each of these models, a speci…c trading mechanism is exogenously …xed, and the focus is on activity within the mechanism that is induced by equilibrium, based again upon optimal behavior of utilitarian individuals.
Our approach complements this literature in two salient ways, and brings to light a new rationale for money that is di¤erent from those propounded earlier, but not inimical to them, in that the door is left fully open to incorporate their concerns within our framework. First, as we have emphasized, our focus is purely on mechanisms of trade with no regard to the characteristics of the individuals such as their endowments, production technologies, preferences or beliefs. Second, no speci…c trading mechanism is speci…ed ex-ante by us. We start with a welter of mechanisms and cut them down by complexity considerations, ultimately ending up with the star mechanism.
The model we present builds squarely upon [8] , which provided an axiomatic characterization of the …nite set of "G-mechanisms" (see section 4.2), bridging the gap between the Shapley-Shubik model of decentralized "trading posts" (see [38] , [39] , [40] ) and the Shapley model of centralized "windows" (see [36] ). Various strategic market games, based upon trading posts (the star mechanism), have been analysed, with commodity or …at money in [4] , [32] , [33] , [34] , [38] , [39] , [40] , [41] ; many of these papers also discuss the convergence of Nash equilibria (NE) to Walras equilibria (WE) under replication of traders. For a continuum-of-traders version of these models, with details on explicit properties of the commodity money (its distribution and desirability) or of …at money (its availability and the harshness of default penalties), which guarantee equivalence (or near-equivalence) of NE and WE, see [7] , [9] , [10] ; and, for an axiomatic approach to the equivalence phenomenon, see [5] .
Strategic market games di¤er in a fundamental sense from the Walras equilibrium model, despite the equivalence of NE and WE. In the WE framework, agents always optimize generating supply and demand functions, but markets do not clear except at equilibrium. We are left in the dark as to what happens outside of equilibrium. In sharp contrast markets always clear, producing prices and trades based on agents' strategies, in the market games; but agents do not optimize except at equilibrium. The very formulation of a game demands that the "game form", i.e., the map from strategies to outcomes, must be de…ned prior to the introduction of agents' preferences on outcomes; thus disentangling the physics of trade from its psychology. Our mechanisms are …rmly in this genre, and indeed form the bases upon which many market-games are built. To be precise: game forms arise from our mechanisms by introducing private endowments, along with the constraints that these impose on individuals' o¤ers; and market games then arise by further introducing preferences.
In conclusion, let us reiterate that our purpose here is to deduce the existence of prices, markets and money in the simplest possible mechanism. To this end we start with the minimalistic postulate that quantities of commodities are o¤ered in trade; adding on only a rudimentary syntax whose sole intent is to enable traders to diversify their o¤ers. Once we have prices, more sophisticated strategies can come into being, wherein agents use prices alongside quantities in a semantic sense, in order to make contingent state-ments and thereby protect themselves against vagaries of the market. For extensions in this direction of the Shapley-Shubik trading-posts game form, see [6] ; and for the much more complex extension of the Shapley-windows game form, see [26] . It may well be that a uni…ed abstract approach exists, which encompasses these two models, and more, and does within the Bertrandian setting what we have done in the Cournotian, but that is a topic for future exploration.
The Formal Model

Exchange Mechanisms
We now present the model and the …ve conditions in a more formal manner. The treatment is the same as in [8] , except that we impose the conditions of non-dissipation and ‡exibility in lieu of "Price Mediation" (see section 4.2) that was used in [8] , obtaining a bigger class of mechanisms here.
A exchange mechanism M allows individuals in f1; : : : ; ng to trade by means of quantity o¤ers in each commodity in the set f1; : : : ; mg. Here m is …xed and n = 2; 3;. . . can be arbitrary. As discussed in the introduction, we assume that for each commodity i; there is a …nite set K i of i-indices that can accompany o¤ers in i: Thus the o¤er in i can be an arbitrary vector in R K i + and we de…ne
S (resp. S + ) is the space of o¤ers (resp., strictly positive o¤ers). Also de…ne a = (a 1 ; : : : ; a m )
where a i 2 R + is the sum of the components of a i 2 R K i + , and denotes the total amount of commodity i involved in sending o¤er a i : Let S n be the n-fold Cartesian product of S with itself, and (with a = (a 1 ; : : : ; a n )) let
denote the n-tuples of o¤ers that are positive on aggregate. Also let C = R m + denote the commodity space; and C n its n-fold product.
An exchange mechanism M , on a given set of m commodities, is a collection of maps (one for each positive integer n) from S(n) to C n such that, if a 2 S(n) leads to returns r 2 C n , then we have (re ‡ecting the conservation of commodities) :
Conditions on the Mechanisms
In this section give a precise statement of each of the …ve conditions on a mechanism M that were alluded to in section 1.1.
The …rst condition is that the mechanism must be blind to all other characteristics of a trader except for his o¤er:
Condition 1 (Anonymity) Suppose a 2 S(n) and a = a : Let r denote the returns that accrue from a:Then r = r :
The second condition is that if any trader pretends to be two di¤erent persons by splitting his o¤er, the returns to the others is una¤ected. It is easier (and su¢ cient !) to state this for the "last"trader.
Condition 2 (Aggregation) Suppose a 2 S(n) and b 2 S(n + 1) are such that a = b for < n and a n = b n + b n+1 . Let r,s denote the returns that accrue from a;b respectively. Then r = s for < n:
As remarked before, Anonymity and Aggregation immediately imply that, regardless of the size n of the population, the return to any trader may be written r(a; b);where a 2 S is his own o¤er and b 2 S + is the aggregate of all o¤ers. Recall that (a; b) = r(a; b) a denotes his net trade.
For the remaining conditions, it will be useful to introduce some more notation. Let L P and let w 2 R P :
1. We write L w for the vector obtained by scaling the L-components of w by the scalar 2. We say that a non-zero vector w is an L -vector if its non-L components are 0; equivalently if L w = w 3. By an {j-vector we mean an fi; jg-vector that has a negative i-component, a positive j-component.
In what follows, we will apply this notation and speak of L-o¤ers and L-returns. Also, we will consistently use a for an individual's o¤er and b for the positive aggregate o¤er; so, when we refer to the pair a; b it will be implicit that a 2 S, b 2 S + (and also, for the moment, that a b; though we shall drop this inequality soon, in view of Proposition 6 below).
for all a; b and positive scalars :
The fourth condition is that no trader can get strictly less than his o¤er.
De…ne h 2 K i to be an ij-index (resp., a pure ij-index or an ij-market) if there exists an h-vector a 2 S such that r j (a; b) > 0 for some b (resp., r(a; b) is a j-vector for all b:) Our …fth condition is as follows.
Condition 5 (Flexibility)
If M has an ij-index then it has an ij-market.
As was said, ‡exibility assures us of the presence of enough ij-markets to enable traders to "unbundle"returns.
A mechanism is determined uniquely by its net trade function (a; b) := r(a; b) a, which, although initially de…ned for a b admits a natural extension as follows.
Proposition 6
The net trade admits a unique extension to S S + satisfying
Proof. See Lemma 1 of [8] . Although [8] considers a more restrictive class of mechanisms, we note that the proof of Lemma 1 there only uses the conditions of anonymity, aggregation, and invariance.
In view of the above result, we drop the restriction a b when considering (a; b).
Further Comments on the Conditions
Aggregation does not imply that if two individuals were to merge, they would be unable to enhance their "oligopolistic power" For despite the aggregation condition, the merged individuals are free to coordinate their actions by jointly picking a point in the Cartesian product of their action spaces. Indeed all the mechanisms we obtain display this "oligopolistic e¤ect", even though they also satisfy aggregation.
It is worthy of note that the cuneiform tablets of ancient Sumeria, which are some of the earliest examples of written language and arithmetic, are in large part devoted to records and receipts pertaining to economic transactions. Invariance postulates the "numericity" property of the maps r(a; b) (or, (a; b)) making them independent of the underlying choice of units, and this goes to the very heart of the quantitative measurement of commodities. In its absence, one would need to …gure out how the maps are altered when units change, as they are prone to do, especially in a dynamic economy. This would make the mechanism cumbersome to use.
Non-dissipation (in conjunction with aggregation, anonymity, and the conservation of commodities) immediately implies no-arbitrage: for any a; b neither Flexibility guarantees the existence of certain ij-markets. However the mechanism may well admit complex trading opportunities, such as swaps of commodity bundles, that coexist with the ij-markets; the former comprising, so to speak, a tangled web around the latter. It is our complexity criteria below which eliminate the web and allow only the markets to survive, see Theorem 11.
Complexity
We turn now to the notion of the complexity of such a mechanism. As discussed in the introduction, the idea is to de…ne complexity from the stand-point of a "binary" ij-trader 13 who interfaces with M in order to exchange commodity i for commodity j. We focus on two basic concerns for such a trader: …rst, how long will it take him to e¤ect the exchange; and, second, how di¢ cult will it be for him to …gure out the terms of exchange? The …rst concern leads to the notion of "time complexity", and the second to that of "price complexity".
Time Complexity
We write (v; w; M ) for the smallest "time"t for which there is a sequence
If v; w are restricted to being i-and j-vectors, then by invariance it follows that the ij-time complexity ij (M ) := (v; w; M ) is independent of the particular choice of v; w: We further de…ne the (maximum) time complexity (M ) := max i6 =j f ij (M )g and say that a mechanism M is connected if (M ) < 1:
We denote by M = M(m) the class of all connected mechanisms with commodity set f1; : : : ; mg :
The Emergence of Prices
Recall that R m ++ = is the set of rays in R m ++ ; representing prices. It turns out that prices emerge in connected mechanisms; and the values, under these prices, of o¤ers and returns are conserved for every trader.
Theorem 8 Let
13 We focus on bilateral trades between pairs of commodities because they form an iterative basis for all trade. This is so on account of prices (exchange rates) that will shortly be shown to emerge and govern all trade.
Even though p(b) is only de…ned up to an overall scalar multiple, for each pair i; j we get a well-de…ned price ratio function
Recall the notion of an {j-vector from section 2.1.1. Theorem 8 has the following immediate consequence.
Corollary 9 Suppose (a; b) is an {j-vector. Then
Price Complexity
Note that a binary ij-trader is only interested in net trades (a; b) that are {j-vectors. By the previous corollary, the exchange ratio
is independent of the action a producing the {j-trade, and depends only on p ij (b): Therefore such a trader is interested only in those components of b which "in ‡uence" the function p ij (b).
To make this notion precise, say that component i is in ‡uential for a function f (x 1; : : : ; x l ) if there are two inputs x; x 0 , di¤ering only in the ith place, such that f (x) 6 = f (x 0 ). De…ne the ij-price complexity ij (M ) to be the number of in ‡uential components of the function p ij : Also de…ne the (maximum) price complexity by
The Emergence of Markets: G-Mechanisms
Directed Graphs
In this paper by a graph we mean a directed simple graph. Such a graph G consists of a …nite vertex set V G , togther with an edge set E G V G V G that does not contain any loops, i.e., edges of the form ii. For simplicity we shall often write i 2 G, ij 2 G in place of i 2 V G , ij 2 E G but there should be no confusion.
By a path ii 1 i 2 : : : i k j from i to j we mean a nonempty sequence of edges in G of the form ii 1 ; i 1 i 2 ; : : : ; i k 1 i k ; i k j:
If k = 0 then the path consists of the single edge ij, otherwise we insist that the intermediate vertices i 1 ; : : : ; i k be distinct from each other and from the endpoints i; j. However we do allow i = j, in which case the path is called a cycle. We say that G is connected 14 if for any two vertices i 6 = j there is a path from i to j.
G-mechanisms
Now for (a; b) 2 S S + we set p = p (b) as in (1) and de…ne r (a; b) by
We remark that the left side of (1) is the total value of all the goods "chasing" good j, while the right side is the total value of good j on o¤er. Mechanisms of the form M G will be called (connected) G-mechanisms, and we write M g = M g (m) for the totality of such mechanisms. It is worth noting that M g is a …nite set. Moreover, the formula (2) for the return function of a G-mechanism immediately implies p(b) = p(c) =) r(a; b) = r(a; c) for all a 2 S; b; c 2 S +
In [8] this property was referred to as price mediation and, in conjunction with other axioms, shown to characterize M g :
Minimal Mechanisms
Given M and M 0 in M with complexities ij ; ij ; k i and Clearly is re ‡exive and transitive, and hence constitutes a pre-order on M.
We let M = M (m) denote the set of -minimal elements 15 .
Theorem 11 Minimal mechanisms are G-mechanisms: M M g :
The Emergence of Money
Let us, from now on, identify two mechanisms if one can be obtained from the other by relabeling commodities. Then there are three mechanisms of special interest to us in M g (m) called the star, cycle, and complete mechanisms; with the following edge-sets:
Cycle Complete E G fmi; im : i < mg f12; 23; : : : ; m1g fij : i 6 = jg Notice that the central vertex m of the graph underlying the star mechanism plays the role of money, and is the sole medium of exchange. 16 Consider M and M 0 in M : They might be incomparable in the pre-order : But we can make a …ner distinction on M in terms of the indices and , that were introduced earlier to capture complexity in the worst case scenarios. To this end, we de…ne a pre-order W on M as follows:
We will refer to W -minimal mechanisms in M (m) as strongly minimal and denote by M = M (m) the set of such mechanisms. Our main result is The array clearly exhibits the superiority of the star mechanism. As the number of commodities m increases, the other two will beat star slightly in one component, but will lose by a huge margin to star in the other component.
Proof of Theorem 8
We …x a mechanism M in M with net trade function (a; b). Consider the set of pairs (i; j) for which there is at least one ij-market (pure ij-index) in K, and …x a subset P K which contains exactly one ij-index for each such pair. Let S P S denote the set of P -o¤ers, and de…ne the set of P -o¤ers "subordinate"to v as follows:
Given a vector v 2 S we write hvi for the class of vectors with the same sign as v, thus w 2 hvi if each component w i has the same sign (+; ; 0) as v i .
Lemma 13 Let v; w 2 S then the following are equivalent.
1. There is an a 2 S P (v) such that v + (a; b) 2 hwi for some b 2 S + 2. There is an a 2 S P (v) such that v + (a; b) 2 hwi for all b 2 S + 3. For each u 2 hvi there is an a 2 S P (u) such that u + (a; b) 2 hwi for all b 2 S + Proof. It is evident that (3) implies (2), and (2) implies (1). We now show that (1) implies (3). Suppose v; a; b; w satisfy (1). Given u 2 hvi and b 2 S + , we need to …nd a 2 S P (u) such that u; a ; b ; w satisfy (3). Since u By construction of a we have (v a) i = i (u a ) i for all i, and hence hv ai = hu a i. Also since a and a are P -o¤ers, by aggregation and invariance we have hr (a; b)i = hr (a; b )i = hr (a ; b )i. We note that if x; y are non-negative vectors then hx + yi is uniquely determined by hxi and hyi, thus we get hu + (a ; b )i = hv + (a; b)i = hwi which establishes (3). We note that Lemma 13 (3) only depends on hvi and hwi and we will write hvi ! hwi if it holds. 
Proof. By aggregation, it su¢ ces to prove this when a is a K i -o¤er for some i. By ‡exibility there is some a 2 S P (a) such that r i (a ; b) = 0, while r j (a ; b) has the same sign as r j (a; b) for all j 6 = i. We write a + (a ; b) = (a a ) + r (a ; b) and note that since a is a pure K i -o¤er, the sign of r (a ; b) does not change if we rescale a . If r i (a; b) = 0 we scale up a to ensure a = a, while if r j (a; b) > 0 then we scale down a to ensure a a; in each case the rescaled a satis…es (4). imply hv + (a ; b)i = hwi, whence hvi ! hwi by Lemma 13 (1).
Proposition 16
For b 2 S + and any i 6 = j there is a 2 S P such that (a; b) is an {j-vector.
Proof. Let v be an i-vector and let t = ij (M ) then by de…nition we have a sequence
where w is a j-vector. By the previous lemma we get
By Lemma 13 (3) this means we can …nd sequences u i 2 v i ; a i 2 S P u i for i = 0; : : : ; t 1 such that u i + (a i ; b) = u i+1 . If a = P a i then we have a 2 S P and
which is an {j-vector. It will be convenient to write an {j-vector in the form ( x; y) after suppressing the other components. In the context of the above proposition if (a; b) = ( x; y) then by linearity (a=x; b) = ( 1; y=x), and we will say that the o¤er a (or a=x) achieves an ij-exchange ratio of y=x at b.
Lemma 17 If a
0 ; a 00 achieve ij-exchange ratios 0 ; 00 at b, then 0 = 00 .
Proof. By the previous proposition there exists an a such that (a; b) is a ji-vector; if is the corresponding exchange ratio then by rescaling a; a 0 ; a 00 we may assume that By the inductive hypothesis the right side is zero, hence so is the left side. Finally the uniqueness of the price function is obvious, because the return function of the mechanism dictates how many units of j may be obtained for one unit of i, yielding just one possible candidate for the exchange rate for every pair ij:
Proof of Theorem 11
We say a matrix X is an S T matrix if its rows and columns are indexed by …nite sets S and T respectively; if Y is a T U matrix then the product XY is a well-de…ned S U matrix. For the set [n] = f1; : : : ; ng we will speak of n T matrices instead of [n] T matrices, etc. Lemma 18 M is uniquely determined by a map b 7 ! N b from S + to the space of non-negative m K column-stochastic matrices as follows.
1. The price ray p = p(b) is obtained as the unique solution of
where b = AD b A t is the diagonal matrix of column sums of
The return function is given by
Proof. Let p = p(b) be the price function whose existence is guaranteed by Theorem 8. We will …rst prove formula 7 for r(a; b) and then prove formula 6. By Proposition 6, the return function of the mechanism M is of the form r (a; b) = M b a, where b 7 ! M b is a map from S + to the space of non-negative m k matrices satisfying
(The non-negativity M b follows from that of r (a; b). The …rst display holds by conservation of commodities and the second by invariance.) De…ne
By invariance it follows that p(b 0 ) = 1. Also each column of N b = M b 0 is the return to the o¤er of a single unit in some commodity. Since all prices are 1 at b 0 , Theorem 8 implies that each column of N b sums to 1, i.e., N b is column stochastic. Now by (8) we get (7) and M b b = Ab; with the identity D p A = AE p we have
Using the identity E p b = D b A t p we can rewrite this as
which is precisely (6).
Lemma 19
Let N b in Lemma 18 and let h 2 K i be an ij-market.
1. The h-th column of N b is the j-th unit vector e j , independent of b.
2. Every K i -column of N b is a linear combination of the "pure"K i -columns.
Proof. By de…nition there is an h-o¤er a such that r (a; b) = M b a is a j-return vector. This means that the h-th column of M b has a non-zero entry only in its j-th component. Since N b is obtained from M b by rescaling entries this is also true of N b . By column stochasticity the h-th column of N b must be e j .
For the second part, let h 0 2 K i be an i-index, let v; w be the h 0 -th columns of N b and M b , and suppose the j-th component of v (and hence of w) is non-zero. It su¢ ces to show that in this case the mechanism has an ij-market. However if a is an h 0 -o¤er then r (a; b) = M b a is a multiple of w, and thus the assertion follows from the ‡exibility axiom.
Let G be the graph in which we connect i to j if M has an ij-market. Since M is connected, Lemma 15 implies that G is connected, and we let M 0 = M G denote the corresponding G-mechanism. We will identify the i-
If M has several pure ij-indices for a given j then this involves a choice, however the choice will play no role in the subsequent discussion. We will refer to M 0 as the embedded G-mechanism of M .
To continue we need a result from [35] . Let G be any connected directed graph on f1; : : : ; ng with weights z ij attached to edges ij 2 G. We write Z = (z ij ) for the n n matrix of edge weights of G, setting z ij = 0 if ij = 2 G. We also de…ne
so that is the diagonal matrix of column sums of Z. We de…ne the weight of a subgraph to be the product of its edge weights, thus
We de…ne an i-tree in G to be a (directed) subgraph T with n vertices and n 1 edges, and the futher property that T contains a path from j to i for every j 6 = i. We write T i for the set of i-trees in G, and de…ne
w (z) ; w = (w 1 ; : : : ; w n ) t :
The following lemma from [35] is critical and paves the way for the rest of the analysis.
Lemma 20 If Z; Z ; w are as above then one has Zw = Z w:
We can now prove a key property of embedded G-mechanisms.
Proposition 21
If a price ratio depends on some variable in M 0 , then it does so in M .
Proof. The pure columns of N b are …xed unit vectors, independent of b. By assumption there is a bijection between the pure variables and the nonzero entries c rs (b) of the matrix C b . We denote the pure components of b by x = (x rs ) and the remaining mixed components by y = (y k ). Then by the de…nition of C b we have an expression of the form
By formula (6) and Lemma 20, the prices p in M and M 0 are weighted sums of trees with edge weights c rs and x rs repectively. Let p (x; y) denote the price vector in M at b = (x; y) and let p (x) denote the price vector in M 0 at x. Then by (9) we get p (x) = lim
We now …x a pair of commodities i; j and let (x; y) and (x) denote the price ratios p i =p j in M and M 0 respectively, then we have
Thus if (x) depends on some x-component, so must (x; y). Proof (of Theorem 11). By lemma 15, lemma 19 and the previous proposition (respectively), we have:
If M is strongly minimal then equality must hold throughout. Hence we get
Complexity of G-mechanisms
Let G be a connected graph on f1; : : : ; mg as in section 4.2. Combining formula (1) and Lemma 20 we get the following explicit formula for the price vector p = p (G) = p (G; b) of the associated mechanism M G .
Lemma 22
We have
The price ratio function p ij (G) = p i (G) =p j (G) can be expressed as a rational function in the variables b kl , and by de…nition (see section 3.3) ij = ij (G) is the number of variables that remain in this expression after all possible cancellations have been taken into account. We will write (G) = max ij ij (G) for the complexity of the G-mechanism.
Graphs with complexity 4
If G consists of a single vertex then (G) = 0 by de…nition.
Lemma 23 If G is a cycle then (G) = 2:
Proof. Each vertex i in a cycle has a unique outgoing edge, and we denote its weight by a i . For each i we have p i = b G =a i ; hence p i =p j = a j =a i and the result follows.
By a chorded cycle we mean a graph that is a union G = C [ P where C is a cycle and P , the chord, is a path that connects two distinct vertices of C, but which is otherwise disjoint from C.
Proof. Let i be the initial vertex of the path P , then i has two outgoing edges, ij and ik say, on the cycle and path respectively. Any vertex l 6 = i has a unique outgoing edge, and we denote its weight by a l as before. Let x be the terminal vertex of the path P . If x = j then G has two j-trees, otherwise there is a unique j-tree; similarly if x = k then there are two k-trees, otherwise there is a unique k-tree. Thus we get the following table:
In every case, the ratio p j =p k depends on all 4 variables a j ; a k ; b ij ; b ik , thus (G) 4.
On the other hand, since all vertices other than i have a unique outgoing edge, it follows that if x is any vertex then every x-tree contains all the outgoing edges except perhaps the edges b ij ; b ik and a x (if x 6 = i); thus p x is divisible by all other weights. It follows that for any two vertices x; y the ratio p x =p y can only depend on the variables b ij ; b ik ; a x ; a y . Thus we get (G) 4 and hence (G) = 4 as desired.
Remark 25 A special case of a chorded cycle is a graph T 0 with three vertices that we call a chorded triangle.
For future use we note that for each index j there is an i such that ij 3:
By a k-rose we mean a graph that is a union C 1 [ [ C k , where the C i are cycles that share a single vertex j, but which are otherwise disjoint. Thus a 0-rose is a single vertex and a 1-rose is a cycle. If G is a k-rose for some k 2 then we will simply say that G is a rose:
If each cycle in a rose G has exactly two vertices, i.e. is a bidirected edge, then we say that G is a star.
Lemma 26 If G is a rose then (G) = 4.
Proof. Let G be the union of cycles C 1 [ [ C k with common vertex j as above. Let a 1 ; : : : ; a k be the weights of the outgoing edges from j in cycles C 1 ; : : : ; C k respectively, and for all other vertices x let b x denote the weight of the unique outgoing edge at x: It is easy to see that there for each vertex v of G there is a unique v-tree, and thus the price vectors are given as follows:
Thus we get
Taking i 6 = l, we see that p y =p x depends on 4 variables, and (G) = 4.
Our main result is a classi…cation of connected graphs with (G) 4.
Theorem 27
If G is not a chorded cycle or a k-rose, then (G) 5.
We give a brief sketch of the proof of this theorem, which will be carried out in the rest of this section. The actual proof is organized somewhat di¤erently, but the main ideas are as follows.
We say that a graph H is a minor of G, if H can be obtained from G by removing some edges and vertices, and collapsing certain kinds of edges. Our …rst key result is that the property (G) 4 is a hereditary property, in the sense that connected minors of such graphs also satisfy the property. The usual procedure for studying a hereditary property is to identify the forbidden minors, namely a set of graphs such that G fails to have the property i¤ it contains one of the graphs from . We identify a …nite collection of such graphs. The …nal step is to show that if G is not a chorded cycle or a k-rose then it contains one of the forbidden minors.
Subgraphs
Throughout this section G denotes a connected graph. We say that a graph H is a subgraph of G if H is obtained from G by deleting some edges and vertices.
Proof. For a vertex i in G 0 let p 0 i and p i denote its price in G 0 and G respectively; we …rst relate p 0 i to a certain specialization of p i . Let E; E 0 be the edge sets of G; G 0 respectively, and let E 0 (resp. E 1 ) denote the edges in E n E 0 whose source vertex is inside (resp. outside) G 0 . Let p i be the specialization of p i obtained by setting the edge weights in E 0 and E 1 to 0 and 1 respectively. Then we claim that
where F is the set of directed forests in G such that Indeed, consider the expression of p i as a sum of i-trees in G. The specialization p i assigns zero weight to all trees with an edge from E 0 . The remaining i-trees in G are precisely of the from [ where is an i-tree in G 0 and 2 F , and these get assigned weight wt ( ). Formula (10) is an immediate consequence. Now if i; j are vertices in G 0 , then formula (10) gives
Thus the ij price ratio in G 0 is obtained by a specialization of the ratio in G. Consequently the former cannot involve more variables. Taking the maximum over all i; j we get (G) (G 0 ) as desired.
Collapsible edges
We write out(k) for the number of outgoing edges at the vertex k. In a connected graph we have out(k) 1 for all vertices, and we will say k is ordinary if out(k) = 1 and special if out(k) > 1. Among special vertices, we will say that k is binary if out(k) = 2 and tertiary if out(k) = 3.
De…nition 29
We say that an edge ij of a graph G is collapsible if 1. i is an ordinary vertex 2. ji is not an edge of G 3. there is no vertex k such that ki and kj are both edges of G:
De…nition 30 If G has no collapsible edges we will say G is rigid.
If G is a connected graph with a collapsible edge ij, we de…ne the ijcollapse of G to be the graph G 0 obtained by deleting the vertex i and the edge ij, and replacing any edges of the form li with edges lj. The assumptions on ij imply that the procedure does not introduce any loops or double edges, hence G 0 is also simple (and connected). Moroever each vertex k 6 = i has the same outdegree in G 0 as in G:
Proof. Let k be any vertex of G 0 then k is also a vertex of G. Since i is ordinary every k-tree in G must contain the edge ij; collapsing this edge gives a k-tree in G 0 and moreover every k-tree in G 0 arises uniquely in this manner. Thus we have a factorization
Thus for any two vertices k; l of G 0 we get
) and the result follows.
We will say that H is a minor of G if it is obtained from G by a sequence of steps of the following kind: a) passing to a connected subgraph, b) collapsing some collapsible edges. By Proposition 28 and Lemma 31 we get Corollary 32 If H is a minor of G then (H) (G) :
Augmentation
Throughout this section G denotes a connected graph. We write H G if H is a connected subgraph of G, and write H G to mean H G and H 6 = G. We say that H G can be augmented if there is a path P in G whose endpoints are in H, but which is otherwise completely disjoint from H. We refer to P as an augmenting path of H, and to K = H [ P as an augmented graph of H; note that K is also connected, i.e. K G. It turns out that augmentation is always possible.
Lemma 33
If H G then H can be augmented. Proof. If G and H have the same vertex set then any edge in G n H comprises an augmenting path. Otherwise consider triples (k; P 1 ; P 2 ) where k is a vertex not in H, P 1 is a path from some vertex in H to k, and P 2 is a path from k to some vertex in H. Among all such triples choose one with e (P 1 ) + e (P 2 ) as small as possible. Then P 1 and P 2 cannot share any intermediate vertices with H or with each other, else we could construct a smaller triple. It follows that P = P 1 [ P 2 is an augmenting path.
We are particularly interested in augmenting paths for H that consist of one or two edges; we refer to these as short augmentations of H.
Corollary 34 If H
G then G has a minor that is a short augmentation of H.
Proof. Let K = H [P be an augmentation of H. If P has more than two edges, then we may collapse the …rst edge of P in K. The resulting graph is a minor of G; which is again an augmentation of H. The result follows by iteration.
Lemma 35
If K = H [ P with P = fjk; klg, then for any vertex i of H we have ik (K) = ij (H) + 2:
Proof. The edges (j; k) and (k; l) are the unique incoming and outgoing edges at k. It follows that every i-tree in K is obtained by adding the edge kl to an i-tree in H, and every k-tree in K is obtained by adding the edge jk to a j-tree in H. Thus if a jk and a kl are the respective weights of the two edges in the path P then we have
Thus the price ratio in question depends on two additional variables, and the result follows.
Corollary 36
If G contains the chorded triangle T 0 as a proper subgraph then (G) 5:
Proof. By the previous corollary G has a minor K = T 0 [ P , which is a short augmentation of T 0 , and it is enough to show that (K) 5. If P consists of two edges fjk; klg then by Remark 25 we can choose i such that ij (T 0 ) = 3; now by the previous lemma we have c ik (K) = 5 and hence (K) 5. If P consists of a single edge then K is necessarily as below, and once again (K) 5.
The circuit rank
As usual G denotes a simple connected graph, and we will write e (G) and v (G) for the numbers of edges and vertices of G.
De…nition 37
The circuit rank of G is de…ned to be
The circuit rank is also known as the cyclomatic number, and it counts the number of independent cycles in G, see e.g. [3] .
Example 38 If G is a k-rose then c (G) = k, and if G is a chorded cycle then c (G) = 2.
We now prove a crucial property of c (G). Corollary 40 Let G be a connected graph.
2. c (G) = 0 i¤ G is a single vertex.
3. c (G) = 1 i¤ G is a cycle.
4. c (G) = 2 i¤ G is a chorded cycle or a 2-rose.
Proof. The …rst part follows from the previous proposition, the other parts are completely straightforward.
Lemma 41
If G is not a rose and c (G) > 3, then there is some K G such that K is not a rose and c (K) = 3.
Proof. Let R be a k-rose in G with c (R) = k as large as possible, then R G by assumption. If c (R) 2 then any K G with c (K) = 3 is not a rose. Thus we may assume that c (R) > 2; and in particular R has a unique special vertex i and at least three loops. Since R 6 = G; R can be augmented, and S = R [ P is an augmentation, then P cannot both begin and end at i, else R [ P would be a rose, contradicting the maximality of R. Since there are at most two endpoints of P; we can choose two distinct loops L 1 and
Covered vertices
De…nition 42 Let i be an ordinary vertex of G with outgoing edge ij. We say that a vertex k covers i, if one of the following holds:
1. the edges ki and kj belong to G 2. j = k and the edge ki belongs to G If there is no such k then we say that i is an uncovered vertex.
We emphasise that the terminology covered/uncovered is only applicable to ordinary vertices in a graph G. The main point of this de…nition is the following simple observation.
Remark 43 An ordinary vertex is uncovered i¤ its outgoing edge is collapsible.
Lemma 44 Suppose G is a connected graph . Proof. If k is an ordinary vertex covering i then G must contain the edges ki and ik. Thus i and k do not have any other outgoing edges, and if G has a third vertex j then there is no path from k or i to j, which contradicts the connectedness of G, thereby proving the …rst statement.
If k is a binary vertex covering the ordinary vertices i and j then G must contain the edges ki; kj; ij; ji. The vertices i; j; k cannot have any other outgoing edges, so a fourth vertex would contradict the connectedness of G as before. This proves the second statement.
If a vertex k covers i then there must be an edge from k to i. Thus if out(k) = 3 then k can cover at most three vertices.
If c (G) = 3 then G has either 2 binary vertices or 1 tertiary vertex, with the remaining vertices being ordinary. If v (G) > 4 then by previous two paragraphs G would have an uncovered vertex, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 27
Proposition 45 If c (G) 3 and G is not a rose, then (G) 5:
Proof. By Proposition 28 and Lemma 41 we may assume that c (G) = 3. By Lemma 31, we may further assume that G is rigid, and thus by Lemma 44 that v (G) 4. We now divide the argument into three cases.
First suppose that G contains a 3-cycle C. We claim that at least one of the edges of C must be a bidirected edge in G, so that G properly contains a chorded triangle T 0 , whence (G) 5 by Corollary 36. Indeed if G has no other vertices outside C, then G must have 5 edges and 3 vertices and the claim is obvious. Thus we may suppose that there is an outside vertex l. We further claim that C contains two vertices i; j such that i covers j. Granted this, it is immediate that G contains either the bidirected edge ij and ji, or the bidirected edge jk and kj where k is the third vertex of C. To prove the "further"claim we note that the special vertices of G consist of either a) one tertiary vertex, or b) two binary vertices. In case a) the connectedness of G implies that the tertiary vertex must be in C, and hence it must cover both the ordinary vertices in C. In case b) either C contains both binary vertices, one of which must cover the unique ordinary vertex of C; or C contains one binary vertex, which must cover one of the two ordinary vertices of C.
Next suppose that G does not contain a 3-cycle, but does contain a 4-cycle labeled 1234, say. Now G has two additional edges, which cannot be the diagonals 13; 31; 24; 42, since otherwise G would have a 3-cycle; therefore G must have two bidirected edges. The bidirected edges cannot be adjacent else G would have a collapsible vertex, therefore G must be the …rst graph below, which has (G) 5.
Finally suppose G has no 3-cycles or 4-cycles. Then every edge must be a bidirected edge, and G must be a tree with all bidirected edges. Since G is not a star, this only leaves the second graph above, which has (G) 6:
We can now …nish the proof of Theorem 27. Proof. (of Theorem 27) If c (G) 2 then by the previous corollary, G is a single vertex, a cycle, chorded cycle or a 2-rose. If c (G) 3 then the result follows by the previous proposition:
Proof of Theorem 12
In this section, after a couple of preliminary results, we apply Theorem 27 to prove Theorem 12.
Lemma 46 If G is a chorded cycle on 4 or more vertices, then (G) 3:
Proof. We can express G as a union of two paths P; Q from 1 to 2, say and a third path R from 2 to 1. At least one of the …rst two paths, say P must have an intermediate vertex, say 3. Since m 4 there is an additional intermediate vertex 4 on one of the paths.
If m = 4 then we get three possible graphs depending on the location of the vertex 4:
For these graphs we have 24 = 3; 42 = 3 and 34 = 3, respectively. Thus (G) 3 in all three cases. If m > 4 then G can be realized as one of these graphs, albeit with additional intermediate vertices on one or more of the paths P; Q; R. These additional vertices are ordinary uncovered vertices, with collapsible outgoing edges. Collapsing one of these edges does not increase time complexity, and produces a smaller chorded cycle G 0 . Arguing by induction on m we conclude (G) (G 0 ) 3:
Lemma 47 If G is the complete graph, then ij (G) = m (m 1) for all i 6 = j.
Proof. Fix a pair of vertices i 6 = j in G, then we claim that the price ratio p ij (G) depends on each of the m (m 1) edge weights b kl . Indeed if H is any "spanning" connected subgraph of G then p ij (H) is obtained from p ij (G) by specializing to 0 the weights of all edges outside H. Therefore it su¢ ces to …nd a connected subgraph H such that p ij (G) depends on b kl .
We consider two cases. If fi; jg = fk; lg then exchanging i; j if necessary we may assume i = k; j = l. Let H be an m-cycle two of whose edges are ij and hi (say); then p i =p j = b hi =b ij depends on b kl = b ij :
If fi; jg 6 = fk; lg then let H be an 2-rose with loops C 1 and C 2 such that 1. k is the special vertex, and kl is an edge in C 1 2. i belongs to C 1 and j belongs to C 2
Then p i and p j are each given by unique directed trees T i and T j . Moreover T i involves kl while T j does not. Hence p ij (H) depends on b kl :
Proof. (of Theorem 12) The star mechanism has complexity ( ; ) = (2; 4). Therefore if G is any strongly minimal graph then either (G) = 1 or (G) 4. For (G) = 1 we get the complete graph, which has complexity ( ; ) = (1; m (m 1)) by Lemma 47. The graphs with (G) 4 are characterized by Theorem 27, and we have three possibilities for G:
with 12 = 3:
Thus G has complexity ( ; ) = (3 + ; 4) and so is not strongly minimal.
Thus the three graphs in the statement of Theorem 12 are the only possible strongly minimal mechanisms, and have the indicated complexities. Since they are incomparable with each other, each is strongly minimal.
Remark 48 For m = 3, Lemma 46 does not hold and we have an additional strongly minimal mechanism with ( ; ) = (2; 4), namely the chorded triangle # -
A Continuum of Traders
Our analysis easily extends to the case where the set of individuals T is the unit interval [0; 1], endowed with a nonatomic population measure 18 . Let S denote the collection of all integrable functions a : T 7 ! S such that R T a 2 S + . (An element of S represents a choice of o¤ers by the traders in T which are positive on aggregate.) In the same vein, let R denote the collection of all integrable functions from T to C; whose elements r : T 7 ! C represent returns to T: An exchange mechanism M , on a given set of m commodities, is a map from S to R such that, if M maps a to r then we have (re ‡ecting conservation of commodities): Z We wrap the aggregation and anonymity conditions into one, and directly postulate that the return to any individual depends only on his own o¤er and the integral of everyone's o¤ers, and that this return function is the same for everyone. Thus we have a function r from S S + to C such that r(t) = r(a; b), where a = a(t) and b = R T a: The rest of the analysis is exactly the same (with obvious modi…cations in the notation, occasioned by the continuum). The only di¤erence is in the proof of the fact that r is linear in the …rst factor and homogeneous of degree 0 in the second, which proceeds as follows. 
